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Abstract
We explain that revisions to successive density forecasts of the same outcome, as
measured by the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion, need not be unpredictable,
unlike those to conditional mean forecasts, even when the forecaster uses information
eﬃciently. However one can still test the eﬃciency of ﬁxed-event conditional density
forecasts, similarly to conditional mean forecasts, by testing the independence of
revisions to an event forecast extracted from the density forecast. In an application
we thereby test the eﬃciency of the ﬁxed-event density forecasts of U.S. inﬂation
and GDP growth supplied by the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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11 Introduction
Despite the increased use of density forecasts in economics, since they provide a full
impression of forecast uncertainty, focus has been on so-called “rolling” density forecasts,
i.e. successive (t = 1,...,T) h-step ahead forecasts with evaluation tests proposed by
Diebold et al. (1998). These test the ex post performance of density forecasts as a ‘whole’;
in practice this involves using a goodness-of-ﬁt test to establish whether the probability
integral transforms of the forecast density with respect to the realisations (t = 1,...,T) of
the variable of interest are uniform or via a transformation normal. Scoring rules have also
been employed (see Gneiting & Raftery (2007) for a review), although they test relative
rather than absolute performance.
But in practice forecasters are often asked to make successive density forecasts of
the same event, i.e. “ﬁxed-event” forecasts, as well as series of forecasts of ﬁxed length
h. For example, in the Survey of Professional Forecasters [SPF] forecasters are asked at
lags of one to eight quarters what, in probabilistic terms, they expect the outturn for
annual U.S. inﬂation and output growth in a given year to be. There are therefore in
total a sequence of eight forecasts of the same event. These indicate how the forecaster
has changed their mind. However, little attention has been paid, at least explicitly, to
the ﬁxed-event aspect of density forecasts and what (if anything) can be inferred from
revisions to successive density forecasts of the same event. This is despite the availability
of tests for the rationality of ﬁxed-event point forecasts (Nordhaus (1987) and Clements
(1997)), the testable proposition (for weak eﬃciency) being that, under quadratic loss,
forecast revisions should be uncorrelated with past forecast revisions.
In this paper we begin to remedy this shortcoming by showing, in Section 2, that one
apparently obvious extension to density forecasts, using the Kullback-Leibler Information
Criterion (KLIC) to measure revisions to successive densities, need not convey any in-
formation on forecast rationality. This precludes testing the weak eﬃciency of density
forecasts simply, as with point forecasts, by testing the independence of KLIC revisions.
But Section 3 notes that one can still test the rationality of ﬁxed-event density forecasts,
similarly to ﬁxed-event point forecasts, by reducing them to a probability event forecast.
This is based on the fact that if the density forecast, from which a probabilistic event
forecast is extracted, is rational then all interval and probabilistic event forecasts must be
well-calibrated also. On this basis, in Section 4, we test the eﬃciency of the ﬁxed-event
density forecasts of inﬂation and GDP growth supplied by the SPF and thereby provide
exploratory evidence on predictability in diﬀerent aspects of the forecast density to the
2traditional analysis focused on the conditional mean. Section 5 concludes.
2 Fixed-event forecasts and “news”
2.1 Revisions to point forecasts
“News” as traditionally deﬁned with reference to point forecasts, or national accounts data
(cf. Faust et al. (2005)), implies that the revision or diﬀerence between a forecast made
at horizon h and a forecast made at horizon (h + 1), so-called “ﬁxed-event” forecasts,
reﬂects information unknown and unpredictable at horizon (h + 1). Under quadratic
loss the revision between successive ﬁxed-event point forecasts is news and is therefore
unpredictable when the forecaster eﬃciently processes the information available to them
at the time they made the forecast (see Nordhaus (1987)).
More formally, let g(yt | Ψt−h) denote the forecast density of yt (t = 1,...,T) made
h (h = 1,...,H) periods ahead conditional on the information set Ψt−h available to the
forecaster. Under squared error loss the (optimal) point forecast extracted from g(yt |
Ψt−h) will equal the conditional mathematical expectation E(yt | Ψt−h). Under other loss
functions it need not (e.g. see Zellner (1986)). But in any case when E(yt | Ψt−h) is a
rational expectation for the mean of {yt} it should equal the (true) conditional expectation
E(yt | Ωt−h), where Ωt−h = {Ωt−h−1,Ωt−h−2,..} is all available information available at
horizon (t − h), where Ψt−h ⊆ Ωt−h.
The law of iterated expectations then implies
E[E(yt | Ψt−h) | Ψt−h−1] = E(yt | Ψt−h−1) ⇒ E[E(yt | Ψt−h) − E(yt | Ψt−h−1) | Ψt−h−1] = 0
(1)
which means revisions to successive conditional mean forecasts are unpredictable using
information known to the forecaster when the earlier forecast was made at horizon (t −
h−1). When the information set Ψt−h−1 is assumed to consist only of previous or lagged
revisions then (1) is classed a test for “weak” eﬃciency. Indeed, (1) then amounts to
saying, using Nordhaus’ (p. 673) oft-quoted line: “If I could look at your most recent
forecast and accurately say, ‘Your next forecast will be 2% lower than today’s’, then you
can surely improve your forecast”. Under these conditions forecast revisions are spiky not
smooth.
Strong eﬃciency, or rationality, requires that the information set consists of all avail-
able information, including knowledge of the true conditional density. That is, under
3rationality the conditional density forecast g (yt | Ψt−h) = f(yt | Ωt−h), the true condi-
tional density, and the forecasts are fully eﬃcient with respect to the ‘true’ information
set Ωt−h; in other words the KLIC distance between the true, but in general unknown,
conditional density and the forecast density equals zero.1 This is precisely the null hypoth-
esis tested when practitioners apply a goodness-of-ﬁt test to establish whether a sequence
of probability integral transforms, computed for a series of rolling density forecasts, are
uniform and serially independent at orders greater than or equal to h; see Bao et al.
(2007) and Mitchell & Hall (2005). That is, when the KLIC distance equals zero, and
f(yt | Ωt−h) = g(yt | Ψt−h), the probability integral transforms zt|t−h =
Z yt
−∞
g(u)du
(t = 1,...,T) are uniformly distributed.
2.2 Revisions to density forecasts
To understand what can be inferred from the movement of and revisions to ﬁxed-event
density forecasts requires us to measure the revision between two successive density fore-
casts of the same event. A natural candidate is the KLIC revision. The KLIC is a measure
of divergence between two densities. Lahiri & Liu (2006) also used the KLIC to measure
the revision between successive density forecasts.
Deﬁne KLICt|t−h as the revision between the (h + 1) and h period ahead density
forecasts of yt:
KLICt|t−h =
Z
g(yt | Ψt−h−1)ln

g(yt | Ψt−h−1)
g(yt | Ψt−h)

dyt. (2)
Analogously to the case for point forecasts, for the KLIC revision between g(yt | Ψt−h)
and g(yt | Ψt−h−1) to constitute “news” it should be unpredictable when the forecaster
forms rational forecasts and it should reﬂect information not known at horizon (t−h−1).
But below we show, via a simple example, that we should not expect the KLIC revi-
sions, KLICt|t−h, to be independent even when the density forecasts are rational. This
precludes testing the predictability of KLIC revisions as a means of testing the weak
eﬃciency of ﬁxed-event density forecasts.
1Rationality implies a “one-to-one relationship” between the moments of g (yt | Ψt−h) and f(yt | Ωt−h);
see Pesaran (1987), p. 24.
42.2.1 The predictability of conditional variance forecasts
Deﬁne the h-step ahead mean and variance forecasts as “unpredictable” (cf. Clements &
Hendry (1998), p.38) with respect to information available to the forecaster at horizon
(h + 1) when2
E[E(yt | Ψt−h) | Ψt−h−1] = E(yt | Ψt−h−1) (3)
E[V(yt | Ψt−h) | Ψt−h−1)] = V(yt | Ψt−h−1) (4)
For KLIC revisions to be independent we should expect both (3) and (4) to hold when
the density forecasts are rational. But this will not usually be the case in economics. This
is because the true, but in general unknown, conditional density varies at each horizon,
and so, in general, we should not expect the sequence of KLIC revisions to be independent
even under forecast rationality. To illustrate consider a simple example.
Via the Wold decomposition theorem any zero-mean covariance stationary process
{yt} can be written in the form
yt = µ +
X∞
j=0 ψjεt−j (5)
where ψ0 = 1,
X∞
j=0 ψ
2
j < ∞ and εt is white noise with variance σ2.
Ignoring parameter uncertainty, Table 1 shows ﬁxed-event conditional forecasts for
both the mean and variance of (5) at forecast horizons of 0,1,...,∞ periods. These are
rational density forecasts; the forecaster knows the ‘true’ underlying model and sets their
subjective density forecasts of yt equal to it such that E(yt | Ψt−h) = E(yt | Ωt−h) and
V(yt | Ψt−h) = V(yt | Ωt−h). For convenience we set µ = 0. Although the forecaster’s
optimal point forecast need not equal the conditional mean, as discussed, if the density
forecast is rational then irrespective of the loss function the conditional mean forecast
should equal the true mean.3 Table 1 also shows the revision between successive mean and
variance forecasts. The lower panel of Table 1, for the convenience of the reader, extracts
the forecasts for an AR(1), a special case of (5) with stationarity imposing |φ| < 1.
From Table 1 we can see that while the mean forecasts are unpredictable when formed
2We do not believe the present focus on the ﬁrst two moments is restrictive. But future work, of
course, might think of generalising the analysis to higher moments, if these exist. But our aim here is
to demonstrate, for which our focus on the ﬁrst two moments is suﬃcient, that revisions to successive
density forecasts need not convey any information on forecast rationality.
3Indeed as discussed by Engelberg et al. (2006) and Clements (2007) there can be a divergence between
the two.
5Table 1: The evolution of ﬁxed-event density forecasts for an MA(∞) and AR(1) model
MA : yt =
X∞
j=0 ψjεt−j
Horizon (h) E(yt | Ψt−h) V(yt | Ψt−h) E(yt | Ψt−h)− V(yt | Ψt−h)−
E(yt | Ψt−h−1) V(yt | Ψt−h−1)
0 yt 0
1
X∞
i=1 ψiεt−i σ2 ψ1εt−1 −ψ
2
1σ2
2
X∞
i=2 ψiεt−i (1 + ψ
2
1)σ2 ψ2εt−2 −ψ
2
2σ2
3
X∞
i=3 ψiεt−i (1 + ψ
2
1 + ψ
2
2)σ2 ψ3εt−3 −ψ
2
3σ2
4
X∞
i=4 ψiεt−i (1 + ψ
2
1 + ψ
2
2 + ψ
2
3)σ2 . . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
∞ 0 (1 + ψ
2
1 + ψ
2
2 + ... + ψ
2
∞)σ2
AR(1) : yt = φyt−1 + εt
Horizon (h) E(yt | Ψt−h) V(yt | Ψt−h) E(yt | Ψt−h)− V(yt | Ψt−h)−
E(yt | Ψt−h−1) V(yt | Ψt−h−1)
0 yt 0
1 φyt−1 σ2 φεt−1 −φ
2σ2
2 φ
2yt−2 (1 + φ
2)σ2 φ
2εt−2 −φ
4σ2
3 φ
3yt−3 (1 + φ
2 + φ
4)σ2 φ
3εt−3 −φ
6σ2
4 φ
4yt−4 (1 + φ
2 + φ
4 + φ
6)σ2 . . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
∞ 0 σ2/(1 − φ
2)
rationally, since at horizon (t − h − 1) we do not know εt−h because yt−h has not yet
been observed, there is a trend to the variance forecasts. This trend is predictable since
it depends only on σ2 and the parameters of the forecasting model, which are assumed
known to the forecaster. Indeed the pattern displayed by the ﬁxed-event conditional
variance forecasts might be helpful in inferring something about the forecasting model
either implicitly or explicitly used. For example, from Table 1 we see that as h decreases
the reduction in the variance forecasts is more pronounced the more persistent the time-
series, as measured by a higher φ, is perceived to be.
Revisions to the mean forecasts are therefore white noise but, consistent with the “fan”
shape of density forecasts published by the Bank of England and others, the variance
6declines as we get closer to the event of interest. Therefore unlike the point forecasts,
revisions to ﬁxed-event variance forecasts should not be white noise even under rationality.
Importantly they decline in a manner which is predictable. This means our best guess
of V(yt | Ψt−h) at horizon (t − h − 1) is not V(yt | Ψt−h−1). If parameter uncertainty is
accommodated, the conditional variances need no longer be monotonically increasing in
h; see Chong & Hendry (1986). However they remain predictable.
Therefore when the variance is forecastable, which as we have discussed it often is for
economic forecasts, KLIC revisions are not news even if the forecaster were rational. This
implies E(KLICt|t−h | KLICt|t−h−1) 6= 0. We can see this analytically when g(yt | Ψt−h)
and g(yt | Ψt−h−1) are assumed normal, so that the KLIC revision is given as:
KLICt|t−h = −0.5−0.5ln
V(yt | Ψt−h−1)
V(yt | Ψt−h)
+
(E(yt | Ψt−h) − E(yt | Ψt−h−1))
2
2V(yt | Ψt−h)
+0.5
V(yt | Ψt−h−1)
V(yt | Ψt−h)
.
(6)
Therefore assuming, as in Table 1, that (i) E[E(yt | Ψt−h) | Ψt−h−1] = E(yt | Ψt−h−1)
and (ii) E[V (yt | Ψt−h) | Ψt−h−1)] = V (yt | Ψt−h) we see that the expected KLIC diﬀerence
with respect to information available at (t − h − 1) is
E
 
KLICt|t−h | Ψt−h−1

= −0.5ln
V (yt | Ψt−h−1)
V (yt | Ψt−h)
+ 0.5
V (yt | Ψt−h−1)
V (yt | Ψt−h)
(7)
This implies
E(KLICt|t−h | KLICt|t−h−1) 6= 0. (8)
Therefore, the KLIC revision is not unpredictable even though the forecaster is as-
sumed rational. E(KLICt|t−h | KLICt|t−h−1) = 0 if and only if both (3) and (4) hold. We
might expect these conditions to hold under rationality only when the true conditional
density f(yt | Ωt−h) = f(yt) for all h. This requires {yt} to be independent, i.e. unpre-
dictable with respect to the information set Ωt−h; cf. Clements & Hendry (1998), p.35.
Only then does KLICt|t−h measure only the eﬀect of ‘news’ arriving between periods
t − h − 1 and t − h.
3 Revisions to event forecasts
Density forecasts can always be reduced to forecast probabilities of particular events.
Consider pt|t−h to be the probability forecast made h-periods ahead of an event (such as
a breach of the inﬂation target, a) happening at time t; pt|t−h = P(yt ≥ a | Ψt−h). Let It
7denote a binary variable equal to unity when the event occurs at time t (i.e. when actual
inﬂation turns out greater than a), 0 otherwise. For a given a, pt|t−h can simply be read
oﬀ the density forecast.
Similarly to Christoﬀersen’s (1998) test for the conditional eﬃciency of interval fore-
casts, a probability event forecast pt|t−h is conditionally eﬃcient with respect to the in-
formation set Ψt−h when:
E[It | Ψt−h] = pt|t−h. (9)
We should expect (9) to hold for all (irrespective of a) probability event forecasts
pt|t−h extracted from rational density forecasts. This follows from the fact that if the
density forecast, from which the probabilistic forecast is extracted, is rational then all
interval and probabilistic event forecasts (extracted from the density forecast rather than
declared, as optimal, by the forecaster) must be correctly calibrated also. That is, if
g(yt | Ψt−h) = f(yt | Ωt−h) then E[It | Ψt−h] = E[It | Ωt−h] = pt|t−h, irrespective of the
user’s loss function. However, similarly to how under a general loss function a user’s
optimal point forecast need not equal the conditional mean, a user’s optimal probabilistic
event forecast (as perhaps elicited by a survey in a separate question to the question which
asks for their density forecast) need not equal the conditional expectation E[It | Ψt−h].
Nevertheless, it is of interest to note that both the quadratic probability score, an analogue
of the widely used root mean squared error criterion, and the log probability score,
two popular but speciﬁc loss functions used to evaluate probability event forecasts, are
maximised when pt|t−h = E(It | Ψt−h).
For probability event forecasts which are conditionally eﬃcient we again know from
the law of iterated expectations that:
E{E(It | Ψt−h) | Ψt−h−1} = E(It | Ψt−h−1). (10)
This implies
E(pt|t−h − pt|t−h−1 | Ψt−h−1) = 0, (11)
which says that the revision to the probability event forecast is orthogonal to information
available at (t−h−1), including lagged revisions to the probability event forecasts. Thus
a testable proposition for (weakly) eﬃcient ﬁxed-event density forecasts is that revisions
to probability forecasts, extracted from the density forecast, are independent. When there
is a clear objective, such as a central bank keeping inﬂation less than 2%, it is obvious
what a to consider. But in any case, for the density forecast to be well calibrated overall,
8i.e. rational, (11) needs to hold for all possible a’s. Since an inﬁnity of event forecasts
can be extracted from the density forecast, in an application it is important, as we do
below, to evaluate both over a large number of arbitrary events and over events of speciﬁc
interest.
4 SPF density forecasts for inﬂation and GDP growth
Started in 1969 the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is the oldest quarterly survey
of forecasters in the United States. Initially administered by the ASA-NBER it has
been run by the Philadelphia Fed since 1990. Over its history the survey has asked
various questions, but since 1981 it has recorded quarterly subjective density forecasts
of both inﬂation and output growth at both the individual and aggregate (mean across
individuals) levels. The panel of forecasters are asked for their density forecasts of both
inﬂation and output growth in both the current and next calendar years. Thus there are
eight successive forecasts of the same event. Prior to 1981q3 respondents were asked only
about the current year and not the next year and we therefore conﬁne attention to the
post 1981q3 era. From 1981q3-1992q1 output growth refers to real GNP, thereafter to real
GDP. Following Diebold et al. (1999) we focus on the aggregate SPF density forecasts.
Since respondents’ replies are in the form of tabular histograms these marginal den-
sities are in fact known only in discrete form.4 Prior to analysis we therefore ﬁt normal
distributions, following Giordani & S¨ oderlind (2003). This approach was also followed
by Lahiri & Liu (2006). We ignore the uncertainty associated with these estimates (see
also Engelberg et al. (2006)) and henceforth assume the mean and variance forecasts are
known with certainty.
4.1 Forecast eﬃciency
We have seen that revisions to conditional mean forecasts (given by the mathematical
expectation) should be unpredictable if the forecaster uses information eﬃciently. While
revisions to density forecasts need not be even when formed rationally, revisions to event
forecasts should be. Therefore we test the weak eﬃciency of ﬁxed-event density forecasts
4Major changes in the probability distribution questions occurred in the 1981q3 and 1992q1 surveys.
From 1981q3 respondents were asked to attach a probability to six bins. From 1992q1 this was increased
to 10 bins.
9by reducing them to probability event forecasts. Since an inﬁnity of event forecasts
can be extracted from the density forecast we evaluate both over a large number of
arbitrary events and over events of speciﬁc interest. We deﬁne the events of interest as
the probability that inﬂation falls in its comfort zone of 1-2% and the probability that
GDP growth is ‘around trend’, namely 2-4%.
4.1.1 Testing forecast eﬃciency
To test whether lagged revisions, rt|t−h−1, whether to the conditional mean forecast (as
in previous studies) or the event forecast, explain the current revision, rt|t−h, separately
for each year (t = 1,...,T) traditionally the following regression is considered:
rt|t−h = α
t
1rt|t−h−1 + ut|t−h (h = 1,...,H − 2), (12)
where rt|t−h = pt|t−h−pt|t−h−1, and practitioners test the null hypothesis of weak eﬃciency
H0 : αt
1 = 0. Squared and higher power lagged values of rt|t−h−1 might also be included
as regressors in (12) in an attempt to pick up nonlinear dependence. Here we focus on
linear dependence. This means our results provide a lower bound on the true degree of
ineﬃciency.
Since H is small in our application (the SPF provides only eight forecasts of the same
event, H = 8) results based on estimation of (12) separately for each event, t, are at
best suggestive. We therefore follow Clements et al. (2007) and pool across t in order to
increase the power of the tests. Related approaches have been considered by Davies &
Lahiri (1995) and Clements (1997).
Since revisions to forecasts of diﬀerent targets (t) made at the same time (t − h) are
likely correlated, since when a forecaster changes her mind about her forecast for tomorrow
she will probably also change her forecast for the day after, it is important to model the
likely correlation structure. This involves decomposing the forecasting error as follows
It − pt|t−h = α + ηt|t−h (13)
where ηt|t−h =
h X
j=1
ut|t−j is the sum of the shocks occurring between the time the forecast
was made and the realisation, where assuming homoscedastic shocks E(u2
t|t−h) = σ2
u.
Assuming rational forecasts we should expect α1 = 0 in (12), since E(rt|t−hrt|t−h−1) =
E(ut|t−h−1ut|t−h−2) = 0. The alternative but more commonly used model of Davies and
10Lahiri assumes ηt|t−h =
h X
j=1
ut|t−j + u∗
t|t−h, where
h X
j=1
ut|t−j is interpreted as the common
shock and u∗
t|t−h as the idiosyncratic shock. This is inconsistent with rational forecasts,
since E(rt|t−hrt|t−h−1) = E(ut|t−h−1 +u∗
t|t−h−1 −u∗
t|t−h,ut|t−h−2 +u∗
t|t−h−2 −u∗
t|t−h−1) 6= 0, as
long as E(u∗
t|t−hu∗
t|t−h) 6= 0. In other words, to be consistent with the (weak) rationality
of ﬁxed-event forecasts, as implied by the law of iterated expectations, it is important to
assume that the forecaster has access to ‘private information’ (see Davies & Lahiri (1995),
footnote 13, and also Clements et al. (2007)).
In practice, ﬁrst we follow Clements et al. (2007) and estimate the following set of
regressions across t = 1,...,T:
rt|t−1 = α1rt|t−2 + et|t−1 (14)
rt|t−2 = α2rt|t−3 + et|t−2 (15)
. . . (16)
rt|t−6 = α6rt|t−7 + et|t−6 (17)
and test whether αi = 0 (i = 1,...,6).
Secondly, we test for dependence using a pooled version of (14)-(17); see Clements
et al. (2007):
r
∗ = α
∗r
∗
−1 + e
∗ (18)
where r.t−h denotes the T-dimensional vector comprising rt|t−h stacked across t (t =
1,...,T), r∗ = (r.t−1,r.t−2,...,r.t−6) and r∗
−1 = (r.t−2,r.t−3,...,r.t−7). The covariance structure
of the 6T- error vector e∗ follows from our variant of the Davies-Lahiri model whereby
under rationality E(rt|t−hrt+k|t−h) = E(ut|t−hut+k|t−h) = σ2
u (k = 1,2,...). σ2
u is estimable
from the OLS residuals of (18).
We also consider variants of these tests which accommodate possible aggregation bias.
Eﬃciency tests with aggregated rather than individual-level forecasts, as in our applica-
tion, can result in aggregation bias if, as seems to be the case with the SPF, the consensus
forecast made at (t − h − 1) only becomes available to individual forecasters at horizon
(t−h). A consistent test for H0 : αt
1 = 0 then requires the ﬁrst lag in (12) to be replaced
with the second lag, rt|t−h−2; see Isiklar (2005).
114.1.2 Results for forecast eﬃciency
Table 2 presents t-tests for the signiﬁcance of the lagged revisions for both inﬂation and
GDP growth using (i) equations (14)-(17) and (ii) the pooled equation, equation (18).
Results, for comparative purposes as these are the traditional focus, are also reported for
the conditional mean forecasts extracted from the density forecasts. Table 3 then presents
results replacing the ﬁrst with second lag.
In Table 2 the evidence against weak eﬃciency appears to be greater for the ﬁxed-
event mean forecasts of inﬂation than GDP growth. The pooled test rejects at a 95%
signiﬁcance level the eﬃciency of the inﬂation, but not the GDP, conditional mean fore-
casts. Interestingly, Davies & Lahiri (1999) also rejected the eﬃciency of the inﬂation
(point not conditional mean) forecasts from the SPF.5 Table 3 shows that the inﬂation
forecasts remain ineﬃcient when the ﬁrst lag is replaced by the second.
Turning to the probability event forecasts of inﬂation being in its comfort zone and
the forecasts of GDP growth being around trend, across Tables 2-3 again we see stronger
evidence against the eﬃciency of the inﬂation forecasts. But in Table 3 there is also
increased evidence, as judged by equations (14)-(17), against the eﬃciency of the GDP
growth forecasts with eﬃciency rejected at 95% in two of the ﬁve cases.
Table 4 then presents more detailed results which rather than focusing on events of
interest, test for the weak eﬃciency of the ﬁxed-event probability event forecasts over an
arbitrary 700 events, with a lower range (in increments of 0.2%) between -2% to 5% and
width 1%-5% (in increments of 0.2%). The table reports the proportion of times weak
eﬃciency is rejected at a 95% level of conﬁdence by equations (14)-(17) and the pooled
equation (18). It indicates that a higher proportion of all possible inﬂation forecasts
are ineﬃcient than those for GDP growth. The pooled test indicates that over 46% of all
possible probability event forecasts of inﬂation are ineﬃcient when the ﬁrst lag is included,
down to around 27% when it is excluded. In contrast only about 33% of GDP forecasts
are judged ineﬃcient, falling to 19% when the ﬁrst lag is replaced by the second. This
casts considerable doubt on the eﬃciency, in particular, of ﬁxed-event density forecasts
for inﬂation.
Table 2, and to a lesser degree Table 3, also show that the revisions, whether to the
conditional mean or the probability event forecasts, tend to be positively autocorrelated.
As Nordhaus (1987) explains this is consistent with forecast smoothing. This is seen by
5Our results are also in line with those of Batchelor & Dua (1991) who in an application to Blue Chip
forecasts ﬁnd increased evidence for rationality of real GNP growth than inﬂation (point) forecasts.
12re-writing (12) in a form similar to adaptive expectations, whereby the forecast pt|t−h is
revised linearly in response to the previous revision
pt|t−h = pt|t−h−1 + α
t
1(pt|t−h−1 − pt|t−h−2) + ut|t−h (19)
revealing that αt
1 can be interpreted as a smoothing or gain parameter. In an analysis of
FED Greenbook forecasts Clements et al. (2007) also ﬁnd evidence of forecast smoothing.
They suggest this is motivated by forecasters’ desire both to maintain credibility and
minimise embarrassment, generated when they are seen to ‘change their mind’. Tables 2
and 3 show that a similar story might also be told about the SPF forecasts, and not just
the conditional mean forecast but event forecasts extracted from their density forecasts.
5 Conclusion
Economists are making increasing use of density forecasts, or more popularly “fan” charts.
This reﬂects the fact that point forecasts, namely the “central tendency” of the forecast,
are better seen as the central points of ranges of uncertainty. In contrast density forecasts
provide a full impression of forecast uncertainty. In this paper we seek to understand
what if anything can be inferred from the movement of and revisions to successive den-
sity forecasts of the same event, so-called “ﬁxed-event” density forecasts. This involves
considering how to test whether these forecasts contain all information available at the
time the forecast was made.
We explain that revisions to density forecasts as measured by the KLIC, a measure
of divergence between two densities, need not be unpredictable, unlike those to condi-
tional mean forecasts, even when the forecaster uses information eﬃciently. Revisions to
density forecasts do not comprise entirely of “news”; there is a predictable component.
This follows from the fact that forecast rationality does not rule out predictability of
the conditional variance forecasts. Only if there is a common target at all horizons, or
in other words if the objective is to forecast the unconditional rather than conditional
true (objective) density, will KLIC revisions be independent when information is used
eﬃciently. In general, certainly in economics, we should expect the conditional variance
to be lower the closer the forecaster to the terminal event.
However measuring the revision to a density forecast by reducing it to a revision to
an event forecast we explain that one can then evaluate the rationality of conditional
density forecasts similarly to point forecasts. We show that unpredictability remains a
13feature of rational forecasts. However, in contrast to point forecasts (unless they equal
the conditional expectation which they need not under asymmetric loss) revisions to
probability event forecasts, extracted from the density rather than declared separately by
the forecaster, should be independent whatever the loss function of the forecaster. This
follows because under rationality the forecast is assumed to be “correct”; more speciﬁcally
it is assumed to be conditionally eﬃcient with respect to information available at the time
the forecast was made and therefore equal to the true conditional probability of the event.
In an application to the SPF we ﬁnd that ﬁxed-event density forecasts for inﬂation do
not appear eﬃcient. But there is less evidence that those for GDP growth are ineﬃcient.
This is consistent with the view that the SPF smooth their inﬂation but less so their GDP
growth density forecasts.
Table 2: Testing the weak eﬃciency of ﬁxed-event forecasts: t-tests for the null hypothesis
of eﬃciency
Conditional Mean Probability Event
Inﬂation GDP Growth Inﬂation GDP Growth
1-2% 2-4%
Pooled 2.07 1.82 3.10 1.01
CJS12 1.70 -0.83 3.67 1.62
CJS23 0.89 0.33 1.32 0.33
CJS34 1.73 1.75 1.49 0.37
CJS45 0.75 0.36 -0.20 -0.14
CJS56 0.31 1.61 1.34 0.53
CJS67 0.52 0.69 0.14 0.24
Notes: T-statistics for the null hypothesis of weak eﬃciency: α = 0.
Pooled refers to the test that α∗ = 0 from (18) and CJSjk refer to
the tests of αi = 0 (i = 1,...,6) from equations (14)-(17), where j
and k, j,k = 1,...,6 denote rt|t−j and rt|t−k. Results are based on
estimation from 1988 to 2006
14Table 3: Testing the weak eﬃciency of ﬁxed-event forecasts with the second lag replacing
the ﬁrst: t-tests for the null hypothesis of eﬃciency
Conditional Mean Probability Event
Inﬂation GDP Growth Inﬂation GDP Growth
1-2% 2-4%
Panel -2.13 -0.33 2.71 -0.53
CJS13 -1.11 0.49 1.33 2.72
CJS24 1.51 0.68 2.50 0.49
CJS35 -0.56 -2.00 0.56 -2.26
CJS46 -0.65 -0.81 -0.03 -1.74
CJS57 -2.78 2.34 0.45 -0.37
Notes: See notes to Table 2
Table 4: Proportion of Weakly Ineﬃcient Probability Event Forecasts (out of 700) at a
95% signiﬁcance level
Inﬂation GDP growth
CJS12,...,CJS67 0.197 0.185
Pooled 0.455 0.330
Replacing the 1st lag with the 2nd
CJS13,...,CJS57 0.211 0.159
Pooled 0.270 0.191
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